..."THE ECONOMIST"!
CATTIVISSIMO L'ECONOMIST CON SILVIO BERLUSCONI, SEMPRE.
CATTIVELLO CON ROMANO PRODI AI TEMPI DELLA PRESIDENZA UE.
CATTIVO DI MEDIA INTENSITA' OGGI CON ANTONIO FAZIO.
"PER FAVORE, SE NE VADA SIGNOR FAZIO" E' IL TITOLO DELL'ARTICOLO SUL NUMERO
IN EDICOLA. ANCHE FAZIO E' "UNFIT", "DOVREBBE DARE LE DIMISSIONI O ESSERE
LICENZIATO", TUTTAVIA "IL GOVERNO DI SILVIO BERLUSCONI NON HA FATTO NULLA",
E IL PRESIDENTE CIAMPI RESTA DUNQUE L'UNICA SPERANZA: "ANCHE LUI E' STATO,
A SUO TEMPO, GOVERNATORE DELLA BANCA D'ITALIA E COMPRENDE L'IMPORTANZA DELL'ISTITUZIONE.
HA L'AUTORITA' MORALE E POLITICA PER OBBLIGARE IL SIGNOR FAZIO AD ANDARSENE.
DOVREBBE USARLA".
LA STAMPA
12 agosto 2005
L'Economist al governatore «Se ne vada. Mister Fazio»
«I banchieri centrali fanno un lavoro difficile. La loro efficacia dipende
dall?integrità e dalla discrezione, specie sulla politica monetaria, ma anche
sui temi di vigilanza bancaria. La maggior parte di loro è controllata ed
attenta. Quei pochi che hanno sollevato qualche dubbio sulla propria integrità,
mettendo un piede in fallo, hanno dato le dimissioni in fretta. Che fare,
allora, quando un banchiere centrale si comporta con un tale ostinato disdegno
per i criteri etici che dovrebbe dimettersi, ma non mostra alcuna intenzione
di farlo, senza sentire nemmeno il minimo imbarazzo?». La domanda è a pagina
13 dell?Economist che questa mattina sarà nelle edicole di tutto il mondo
e apre uno dei commenti sui fatti più importanti della settimana. La risposta,
invece, è nel titolo stesso dell?editoriale: «Please go, Mr Fazio», «Per
cortesia se ne vada, signor Fazio». Il governatore, infatti - sostiene l?Economist
- è «unfit», inadatto, a mantenere il suo ruolo dopo che la vicenda Antonveneta
e il suo comportamento nei confronti della Bpi e del suo amministratore delegato
Gianpiero Fiorani, sono divenuti di pubblico dominio. «Unfit» come nell?aprile
del 2001 sempre l?Economist giudicò Silvio Berlusconi inadeguato a governare
l?Italia, attirandosi le ire del premier, e come lo stesso settimanale ha
replicato - questa volta riferendosi al ruolo di Berlusconi in Europa - lo
scorso anno. Anche allora, come adesso, oltre all?editoriale, il settimanale
dedica al nuovo caso italiano un articolo di quattro pagine illustrato da
immagini significative: Fiorani e Fazio che si abbracciano, il finanziere
bresciano Chicco Gnutti sorridente alla guida di un?auto d?epoca, Stefano
Ricucci in un momento di relax a Villa d?Este. Ma che cosa dovrebbe accadere
se Fazio deciderà di snobbare l?esortazione che gli arriva - anche - dal
settimanale che forma l?opinione pubblica delle elités mondiali e deciderà
che mai e poi mai lascerà il suo posto a via Nazionale? Allora l?Economist
vede come estrema ratio l?intervento del Capo dello Stato - nonché ex governatore
della stessa Banca d?Italia, Carlo Azeglio Ciampi. La Banca d?Italia, scrive
l?Economist, «sì è guadagnata una certa reputazione, in patria e all?estero,
fino a qualche tempo fa». E Fazio «merita credito» per tutto quello che ha
fatto: dalla supervisione, assieme al Tesoro, dell?ingresso dell?Italia nell?euro;
fino alla capacità di risolvere in modo appropriato «diversi pasticci bancari»,
così che «l?Italia può adesso puntare ad alcune banche ben capitalizzate
e ben gestite che stanno cominciando a modernizzare un?industria finanziaria
vecchio stile». Lo stesso Fazio, «nominato a vita con un lauto stipendio
nel 1993, ha mostrato un tratto di indipendenza che ha liberato la Banca
dal sospetto che potesse essere influenzata dai politici, rendendola quindi
una sorta di rarità tra le istituzioni pubbliche italiane». Ma questo è il
passato, mette subito in chiaro l?Economist. Negli ultimi mesi «Fazio ha
disfatto il suo buon lavoro. Prima c?è stata la sua risposta deludente allo
scandalo Parmalat, nel quale erano coinvolte direttamente banche nazionali
e straniere». E poi, quando proprio sull?onda dello scandalo Parmalat, il
ministro delle Finanze - che allora era Giulio Tremonti - si è mosso per
varare una serie di riforme «alcune delle quali implicavano una riduzione
degli ampi poteri della Banca d?Italia», allora «Fazio ha usato tutta la
sua influenza per spazzar via queste utili riforme o per annacquarle. E?
stato un pessimo segno». E «il peggio doveva ancora venire», avverte il settimanale.
Le due offerte lanciate dall?Abn Amro e dal Bbva sull?Antonveneta e sulla
Bnl, hanno innescato una reazione a catena: «Fazio ha sostenuto che il risultato
sarebbe dipeso solo dai normali criteri prudenziali. Ha negato pubblicamente
l?accusa di avere una mentalità da ?Fortezza Italia?. Ma dietro le quinte
è intervenuto in modo assai evidente, più e più volte, per favorire le controfferte
italiane». L?Economist punta il dito soprattutto sul caso Antonveneta e sul
sostegno dato a Fiorani. «Ed è la sua condotta in questo caso - ecco la sentenza
del settimanale sul governatore - che lo rende ?unfit? a rimanere al suo
posto». Infatti, «nonostante i seri dubbi dei suoi stessi funzionari, Fazio
sembra essere stato deciso nell?allestire un takeover di Antonveneta da parte
della Bpi, contrastando l?offerta olandese. Ma ciò è stato possibile solo
ignorando le presunte manovre illegali e sottobanco della Bpi».
«I dettagli di come la Bpi si sia fatta largo con le buone o con le cattive
verso il controllo dell?Antonveneta, sono una lettura inquietante. E allo
stesso modo sono inquietanti le prove che un gruppo di uomini d?affari legati
alla Bpi sta provando a conquistare il controllo di beni politicamente sensibili
come il Corriere della Sera». «Ma forse la cosa più allarmante - scrive ancora
il settimanale britannico - è che Fazio sembri convinto di non aver fatto
nulla di male». Al momento «non è ancora chiaro se abbia infranto la legge»,
anche perché «nella sua posizione le regole gli consentono un ampio margine
di discrezionalità». «Ma è già chiaro - conclude il suo editoriale l?Economist
- che non ha agito in modo prudente o etico e ha di fatto gravemente danneggiato
la Banca d?Italia. Nonostante questo, il governo di Silvio Berlusconi non
ha fatto nulla e in apparenza sembra desideroso di veder diminuire il potere
della Banca d?Italia. Un preoccupante tergiversare che non è nell?interesse
del paese». Ma «c?è una speranza» e sta al Quirinale: «Carlo Azeglio Ciampi,
il Presidente italiano, è stato anch?egli governatore della Banca d?Italia
e capisce l?importanza dell?istituzione. Ha l?autorità morale e politica
per forzare Fazio all?uscita, dovreb- be usarla». Parola di Economist.
Nell?articolo dedicato alla cronaca, poi, il settimanale mette sotto i riflettori
gli aspetti «tecnici» della vicenda Antonveneta con un articolo di quattro
pagine. Dopo aver illustrato la rapida e vertiginosa ascesa di Lodi sotto
Fiorani e aver ripercorso l?inchiesta che ha tenuto banco sulle pagine dei
giornali italiani, l?Economist afferma che «un procedimento penale è quasi
certo. Le domande interessanti sono: chi verrà imputato e quale sarà la natura
delle accuse?». Qualche certezza c?è già: «La permanenza di Fiorani come
amministratore delegato della Bpi è probabilmente finita e la conquista dell?Antonveneta
da parte della sua banca è improbabile. Un nuovo management alla Bpi guarderà
severamente i libri contabili. E pochi, nei circoli finanziari milanesi,
sarebbero sorpresi se una nuova squadra insediatasi alla Bpi dovesse trovare
che la banca era, in realtà, praticamente ?bruciata? alla fine dello scorso
anno».
Ma se davvero la situazione patrimoniale della Bpi apparirà così pregiudicata,
come del resto i primi riscontri documentali sembrano indicare, «la domanda
è se Fazio o altri esponenti della Banca d?Italia sapessero o sospettassero
ciò. Se Fazio lo sapeva - dice l?Economist - questo può spiegare perché voleva
che la Bpi conquistasse l?Antonveneta; fondere una banca in declino con un
concorrente più grande è un modo per nascondere i problemi della prima. O
forse il giudizio di Fazio è stato influenzato dalla sua relazione così stretta
con Fiorani».
12/08/2005
CORRIERE DELLA SERA
EMMOT: NON SIETE CREDIBILI. ANCHE A SINISTRA
GIANCARLO RADICE intervista il direttore dell'Economist BILL EMMOTT
www.senato.it/notizie/RassUffStampa/050812/87jnm.tif
12/08/2005
IL RIFORMISTA
SU FAZIO CALA LA BOMBA ECONOMIST
www.senato.it/notizie/RassUffStampa/050812/87k6d.tif
www.economist.com/opinion/displayStory.cfm?story_id=4274953
Italian banking
Please go, Mr Fazio
Aug 11th 2005
From The Economist print edition
Antonio Fazio, the governor of Italy's central bank, should resign or be
sacked
CENTRAL bankers have a difficult job. Their effectiveness depends on integrity
and discretion, notably on monetary policy but also on issues of banking
supervision. Most are sober and careful. The few that have cast doubt on
their integrity by stumbling have resigned quickly. What to do, then, when
a central banker behaves with such wilful disregard for ethical standards
that he ought to resign, but shows no sign of doing so, or even of feeling
a smidgen of embarrassment?
That is the dilemma facing Italy. The Bank of Italy, its central bank, has
enjoyed some respect at home and abroad?until recently. Along with the Treasury,
it oversaw Italy's entry into the euro. Several banking messes were effectively
dealt with, so that Italy can now point to some well-capitalised and well-run
banks that are beginning to modernise the country's old-fashioned financial
industry. For that, Antonio Fazio, the central bank's governor, deserves
credit. Appointed for life on a fat salary in 1993, he showed a streak of
independence that largely freed his bank from suspicions that it could be
influenced by politicians. That made it something of a rarity among Italian
public institutions.
Lately, however, Mr Fazio has undone his good work. First there was his disappointing
response to the Parmalat scandal, in which domestic and international banks
were directly implicated. After the dairy firm collapsed in late 2003 in
Europe's biggest case of corporate fraud, sensible regulatory reforms were
suggested by Italy's finance minister. But some of these involved narrowing
the Bank of Italy's broad powers. So Mr Fazio used all his influence to brush
these useful reforms away or to water them down. This was an ominous sign.
Much worse was to come. When two foreign banks, one Dutch, the other Spanish,
launched contested takeover bids this year for a couple of Italy's smaller
banks, Mr Fazio pretended that normal scruples would govern the outcome.
He publicly denied the accusation that he had a ?fortress Italy? mentality.
Behind the scenes, however, he intervened blatantly again and again to favour
rival Italian bids.
This was especially the case in the battle between the poorly capitalised
Banca Popolare Italiana (BPI) and ABN Amro to win control of Banca Antonveneta,
Italy's ninth-biggest bank. And it is his conduct in this deal that makes
him unfit to remain in his job. Despite serious doubts among his own officials,
Mr Fazio seems to have been determined to engineer a reverse takeover of
Antonveneta by BPI and to thwart the Dutch bid. But this was possible only
by ignoring allegedly illegal and underhand manoeuvres by BPI that led recently
to the suspension of its boss, Gianpiero Fiorani, and of the bid. Mr Fiorani
is a close friend of Mr Fazio's?so close, in fact, that the central banker
personally telephoned Mr Fiorani late at night last month to tell him that
he had approved BPI's bid. That phone call, along with many others, was tapped
by magistrates who suspected that BPI was systematically breaking the rules
and had placed Mr Fiorani under surveillance.
Details of how BPI twisted and inveigled its way to control of Antonveneta
make disturbing reading (see article). So does evidence that a group of businessmen
linked to BPI might be trying to wrest control of politically sensitive assets
that include Corriere della Sera, one of Italy's most respected newspapers.
But perhaps most disturbing is that Mr Fazio seems to believe that he has
done nothing wrong. The Bank of Italy has issued a statement claiming that
its managers have acted properly and legally.
Ciampi's task
It is not yet clear whether or not Mr Fazio has broken the law?in his position
the rules allow him a great deal of latitude. But it is already clear that
he has not acted prudently or ethically and has, in fact, damaged the Bank
of Italy badly. Despite this, Silvio Berlusconi's government has done nothing,
and is apparently willing to see the Bank's authority wither. This is a grievous
lapse that is not in the country's interest. There is one hope. Carlo Ciampi,
Italy's president, was himself once governor of the Bank of Italy and understands
the institution's importance. He has the moral and political authority to
force Mr Fazio out. He should use it.
Italian banking scandal
Brothers in arms
Aug 11th 2005
From The Economist print edition
Many reputations should suffer as a result of a scandal involving Banca Popolare
Italiana and the Bank of Italy
?I JUST put my signature on it.? These were the now notorious words of Antonio
Fazio, governor of the Bank of Italy, on the phone to Gianpiero Fiorani,
the chief executive of Banca Popolare Italiana (BPI), Italy's tenth-largest
bank, shortly after midnight on July 12th. Mr Fazio had just given approval
for BPI to buy a majority stake in Banca Antoniana Popolare Veneta (Antonveneta).
?I'd kiss you right now, on the forehead,? Mr Fiorani replied, in evident
relief. (In an actual embrace, shown above, Mr Fazio is on the left.)
This news meant that BPI's bid for Antonveneta, in which a number of leading
international banks have been involved, could proceed. It also seemed to
spell certain defeat for ABN Amro, a big Dutch bank, with which BPI had been
bitterly contesting control of Antonveneta since March. Antonveneta, based
in Italy's wealthy Veneto region, is the country's ninth-largest bank but,
by capitalisation, was around three times as large as BPI.
The conversation came to light because Mr Fiorani is under criminal investigation;
magistrates had been intercepting his telephone calls for several weeks.
His alleged offences include market-rigging connected to dealings in Antonveneta
shares, false accounting and misleading the Bank of Italy (BOI), which oversees
the banking system.
As supervisor, the BOI is responsible for ensuring the sound and prudent
management of Italian banks. Each time a buyer of an equity stake in an Italian
bank wishes to exceed certain thresholds?5%, 10%, 15%, 20%, 33% and 50%?it
must seek permission from the BOI. Broadly speaking, a potential buyer must
show that it has competent and honest management; a solvent balance sheet;
and a sound plan for the target bank.
So the criminal investigations and the fact that two of the BOI's senior
staff, worried about the strength of the bank's balance sheet, had refused
to approve BPI's bid made Mr Fazio's decision hard to understand. That it
was a grave error of judgment became obvious on July 25th when magistrates
impounded BPI's shares (and those belonging to close allies) in Antonveneta.
(The BOI declines to comment other than to say it has acted properly.) Two
days later, Consob, Italy's stockmarket regulator, had no choice but to freeze
BPI's offer for up to 90 days, as it also suspected that BPI's offer documents
?seriously lacked important information?. Then, on August 2nd, a judge ordered
that Mr Fiorani and BPI's finance director be suspended for the next two
months.
But the story of BPI's attempt to buy Antonveneta not only raises serious
questions about the BOI, Mr Fiorani and his allies. It also raises doubts
about the judgment of banks that have lent their reputations and balance
sheets to BPI, and about the ethics of some of them.
Why did any leading bank want BPI as a customer?
Based on The Economist's examination of publicly available information, set
out below, the first obvious question is: why did any leading bank want BPI
as a customer? And the second: why was the BOI, with privileged access to
information, so keen for BPI, rather than a bigger and healthier rival, to
buy Antonveneta?
Through a buying spree, Mr Fiorani has transformed BPI, until recently called
the Banca Popolare di Lodi, from a regional bank into one with a presence
nationwide. For instance, it has 137 branches in Sicily after buying eight
small banks there in just five years. Between 2000 and 2004, BPI spent roughly
?6 billion ($7.4 billion at current rates) on acquisitions, often paying
what one analyst describes as ?very generous prices?.
These purchases have created a complex group: it comprises BPI, the quoted
parent bank, which has about 60% of the group's retail branches, and two
quoted subsidiaries, one of which is Bipielle Investimenti. Few analysts
cover BPI (and even fewer its two quoted subsidiaries), and few big institutional
investors own shares. Because of the group's constantly changing shape, comparative
analysis of its results is tricky; it is difficult to measure how well acquisitions
have performed.
Since 2000, the group has raised ?3.6 billion from shareholders in six capital
increases. BPI has used its branches to promote its shares (and other financial
instruments) to customers, many of whom have become shareholders. Around
40,000 bought shares for the first time in its most recent issue for ?1.5
billion in July, taking the total number to over 200,000.
Follow the money
But to the extent that these capital increases and other financial instruments
have been paid for with money sitting in customers' accounts, BPI has not
actually brought any new cash on to its balance sheet. Although it has improved
BPI's capital ratios, such a switch of money from deposits to capital erodes
future income by reducing lending possibilities.
An examination of the BPI group's accounts reveals aggressive accounting
practices. BPI is treating some costs, such as those of capital increases
and extraordinary personnel expenses, as intangible assets to be written
off over several years rather than in one.
And how healthy is its balance sheet? The BOI assesses the solvency of a
bank by the adequacy of its core capital?the minimum amount of capital a
bank is required to hold to support its lending. Under EU rules, this must
be kept above the minimum levels at all times. The starting point for the
calculation is the net assets shown in a bank's accounts.
However, in BPI's case, there are doubts about the prudence of its accounts.
Provisions against loans, which are lower than average, are one issue; if
BPI's were adjusted to the level of, for example, Capitalia, a large Italian
bank in which ABN Amro has a 9% stake, its net assets would fall by ?337m.
And BPI's 20% stake in Cassa di Risparmio di Bolzano, a savings bank, is
overvalued by ?209m when measured by the price that a purchaser, acquiring
a majority interest, paid for a 10% stake last year. If the group's core
capital at the end of 2004 were adjusted for just these two items, it would
fall short of the mandatory level.
Moreover BPI has off-balance-sheet commitments which, if valued at market
prices, would reduce its net assets further. It has promised to pay Deutsche
Bank ?330m in 2008 for 30m shares of Bipielle Investimenti that the German
bank bought for only ?198m in 2003. At the end of 2004, these were worth
a mere ?174m.
BPI will have to apply international accounting standards when it prepares
its accounts for 2005. In the absence of reinforcement of its capital, application
of these standards might expose the fragility of its balance sheet. For instance,
off-balance-sheet commitments, such as that with Deutsche Bank, will have
to be marked to market. And goodwill will be subject to an annual impairment
test; if it is true that BPI has overpaid for its acquisitions, then substantial
write-downs might be necessary.
In addition to its commitment to Deutsche Bank, BPI has others, mainly to
the holders of minority stakes in subsidiaries. At the end of 2004, these
amounted to ?881m, over ?500m payable in cash by mid-2005. To the extent
that goodwill arises from the purchase in cash of these stakes, BPI's core
capital would reduce further. This is because intangible assets do not count
towards a bank's core capital.
But the BOI has postponed introducing a directive that would require banks
to take account of these prospective commitments in the calculation of their
core ratios. If these had been applied to BPI's core capital at the end of
2004 together with the other adjustments, then the bank would have fallen
well short of mandatory levels.
Capital ratios are important to supervisors and depositors; investors are
more interested in profits. But there is little consolation here. The 2004
accounts show that, at best, the parent company, BPI, the heart of the group
with 577 branches, did little more than break even, if dividends from its
subsidiaries are excluded. Even then, two factors favourably influenced its
results. First, the marking-to-market of its portfolio of securities at the
end of the year produced a net profit of ?55m compared with a net loss of
?9m the previous year.
Second, there was an increase of ?30m in ?expenses? recovered from customers'
accounts, some (or all) of which may be explained by unusual entries in the
final quarter. Astonished customers found charges, ranging from ?30 to ?125,
for items such as ?urgent commissions?, ?post and telephone expenses? and
?extraordinary commissions? on their bank statements dated December 31st,
the bank's year end. Many asked for reimbursement, and some raised the matter
with the judicial authorities. These charges imply a desperate attempt to
boost profits.
There are also doubts about the quality of Bipielle Investimenti's profits.
Its consumer-credit company booked a profit of ?70m?representing an acceleration
of future interest?from a securitisation of receivables. This flatters current
profits and is only sustainable if consumer debt continues to increase, thereby
allowing more securitisations. Another division enjoyed windfall profits
of ?26m because banker's drafts drawn on it had not been presented within
the requisite time. Together, these items accounted for nearly half of Bipielle
Investimenti's pre-tax profits.
Another serious concern is transparency. Nowhere is it apparent in the group's
2004 accounts that BPI has an equity investment of ?154m in an obscure investment
vehicle called Victoria & Eagle Strategic Fund (VESF), based in the Cayman
Islands; this holds, or at least did in June, 4.1% of BPI. If BPI had bought
the shares directly, disclosure in its accounts would have been mandatory.
And, unlike an investment by BPI in its own shares, the investment in VESF
is not deductible from BPI's core capital.
The pact of the matter
In spring 2004, Antonveneta was up for grabs; it was clear that a shareholders'
pact, which owned 31% of the bank, would not be renewed in April 2005. The
pact's members included ABN Amro, the Benetton family and several businessmen,
one of whom was Emilio Gnutti, a controversial financier. These parties had
formed the pact in March 2002 to provide stability of ownership and ensure
autonomy for the bank's management.
Ropi
Blind to his failings
One possibility was a merger between Antonveneta and Capitalia. This deal
fell apart when the BOI would not allow ABN Amro?the biggest shareholder
in both the banks?more than 15% of the merged bank, whereas ABN Amro wanted
20%.
Mr Fiorani had a different idea; he began to promote BPI as a significant
shareholder in Antonveneta. Mr Fazio, whose opposition to foreign ownership
of Italian banks is well known, met Antonveneta shareholders. In early December,
according to the Benetton group, he encouraged Gilberto Benetton, who was
keen to sell his family's 5% stake, to be a good Italian when making his
decision. Two weeks later, BPI extended the Benettons a loan of ?325m to
be repaid in cash or with its shares in Antonveneta.
Mr Gnutti controls Hopa, an investment company, of which Mr Fiorani is a
director. And Hopa and BPI have reciprocal shareholdings. Mr Gnutti was keen
to increase his stake in Antonveneta, and was a natural ally for Mr Fiorani.
Their plan was to gain control of Antonveneta's board at its annual general
meeting at the end of April, an objective possible with around 30% of the
votes.
Mr Gnutti has recently found himself in various scrapes. He has been found
guilty of insider trading, though in Italy no conviction is definitive until
confirmed by the final appeals court, which is yet to happen in Mr Gnutti's
case. He is also currently on trial with a fellow director of Hopa, the chief
executive of Unipol, an Italian insurer which has just launched a ?5 billion
bid for BNL, an Italian bank, for alleged insider trading in Unipol bonds.
Three reports by Consob show how Mr Fiorani and Mr Gnutti went about their
business. BPI could not immediately buy a sizeable stake in Antonveneta.
This was because it would need the BOI's permission; it had neither enough
core capital nor a credible plan for the bank.
So between December 2004 and the end of February, BPI lent ?552m at advantageous
interest rates to 18 associates of Mr Gnutti, to buy 9.5% of Antonveneta.
The Consob report states that there is a strong presumption that BPI promised
these businessmen that it (or its allies) would eventually buy these shares
and that they would make a gain. Another 20 people, including Stefano Ricucci,
a property developer, bought a further 11.7% of Antonveneta, with BPI providing
loans of ?666m to 19 of them. BPI should have disclosed details of these
loans to the BOI, but did not.
And press releases, which claimed to correct rumours about dealings in Antonveneta's
shares, gave misleading information. For instance, on April 6th, BPI correctly
stated its own stake but (falsely, on the basis of the Consob reports) denied
there were any other agreements?written or oral?with third parties in respect
of other shares. BPI's plan of deception was well under way.
When BPI told the BOI on February 11th of its intention to buy up to 14.9%
of Antonveneta, the BOI could not have been more helpful. It approved the
application over a weekend. The authorisation said that BPI should build
up its stake only to the extent it took measures to strengthen its core capital.
This was to ensure full and continuous respect for the minimum level. Normally,
however, the BOI achieves this goal by insisting that a bank strengthen its
core capital before giving permission. The BOI did not inform Antonveneta
about the authorisation until April 23rd, an unusual delay; nor did BPI tell
ABN Amro (which it met in March for talks) or the market.
But then ABN Amro made a move, announcing a cash offer for Antonveneta at
?25 per share. If this offer succeeded, Mr Fiorani's plan would be in tatters.
So to block ABN Amro, BPI would need a majority of Antonveneta's shares.
ABN Amro's offer could not proceed until the BOI gave its permission. However,
when the Antonveneta pact expired on April 15th, the Dutch bank, the biggest
shareholder with 12.7%, could increase its stake up to 33% if the BOI let
it.
At the end of March, ABN Amro asked permission to acquire control, a process
likely to take more than a month. To ensure it was free to buy shares as
soon as possible after April 15th, it also asked?in the hope it would be
granted without delay?to cross the 15% and 20% thresholds.
But, on April 19th, the BOI said ABN Amro could not increase its stake beyond
20%. The principal reason given was that the bank's request was tantamount
to one for majority control and therefore needed the same scrutiny as the
one to exceed the 50% threshold. This meant the Dutch bank could buy only
another 7% of Antonveneta when the pact expired.
Meanwhile, again without informing Antonveneta, the BOI, applying a different
standard, had authorised BPI to acquire up to 29.9%, taking only three days
to approve BPI's request of April 4th.
The BOI was aware that BPI did not then have enough core capital to acquire
more than 20%. However, it was receptive to the idea that BPI acquire voting
rights for the remaining 10% by stock-borrowing. This involves renting shares
for a limited period in return for a fee. The BOI thought BPI would buy these
shares outright once it had strengthened its capital base.
But BPI was working to a different plan. After April 15th, when the Antonveneta
shareholders' pact expired, large volumes of that bank's shares would be
on the market. By April 18th at the latest, according to Consob's reports,
BPI had formed a secret concert party, which included Mr Gnutti, Mr Ricucci
and six others. Under stock-exchange rules, people acting in concert to acquire
shares in a listed company are regarded as one. This is to prevent the circumvention
of takeover law, such as that requiring a mandatory cash offer once a bidder
exceeds a 30% threshold.
( continua nella discussione seguente...)